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In addition to causing 12 human deaths and 17 cases
of human infection, the 2004 outbreak of H5N1 influenza
virus in Thailand resulted in the death or slaughter of 60
million domestic fowl and the disruption of poultry produc-
tion and trade. After domestic ducks were recognized as
silent carriers of H5N1 influenza virus, government teams
went into every village to cull flocks in which virus was
detected; these team efforts markedly reduced H5N1 infec-
tion. Here we examine the pathobiology and epidemiology
of H5N1 influenza virus in the 4 systems of duck raising
used in Thailand in 2004. No influenza viruses were detect-
ed in ducks raised in “closed” houses with high biosecurity.
However, H5N1 influenza virus was prevalent among
ducks raised in “open” houses, free-ranging (grazing)
ducks, and backyard ducks.
T
he continuing spread of H5N1 avian influenza viruses
from eastern Asia to domestic and wild birds in central
Asian countries, including Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Russia,
and Turkey, indicates the extent to which the geographic
range of this highly pathogenic influenza virus has expand-
ed. The highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses were first detect-
ed in 1996 in geese in Guangdong, China (1); they later
spread to ducks in the coastal provinces of South China (2)
and to Hong Kong’s live poultry markets (3). These virus-
es infected at least 18 persons in Hong Kong, 6 of whom
died (4). The viruses were eradicated in 1998 by the
culling of all poultry in Hong Kong and by changing mar-
keting practices. Although these particular genotypes have
not been detected again, other H5N1 genotypes continued
to emerge in 2000 and 2001 (5).
The biology of the H5N1 viruses changed dramatically
for the first time in late 2002, when the viruses were iso-
lated from dead wild aquatic birds in Hong Kong and from
decorative waterfowl that died in Kowloon Park, Hong
Kong (6,7). After the Z genotype of H5N1 influenza
became established as the dominant H5N1 influenza virus
in eastern Asia, it was transmitted to persons in Vietnam,
Thailand, and Cambodia. In 2004, a distinguishable geno-
type was transmitted to persons in Indonesia (8). Most
human cases have resulted from the direct transmission of
virus from poultry to humans (9). To date, evidence for
human-to-human transmission is limited (10,11). In
Thailand, 13 persons infected with an H5N1 influenza
virus died in 2004, and 2 additional human deaths occurred
in October 2005. By contrast, in neighboring Vietnam, 42
human deaths caused by H5N1 influenza virus were
reported in 2005. What accounts for these differences?
Here we examine the hypothesis that the lower death rate
in Thailand resulted in part from that government’s recog-
nition of the role of backyard chickens and domestic ducks
in the spread and perpetration of H5N1 influenza virus and
the government’s aggressive culling of flocks in which the
virus was detected (12). 
Thai health officials recognized that the spread of
H5N1 influenza viruses to domestic chickens correlated
with the distribution of free-grazing ducks (13). At the
beginning of the 2004 poultry outbreak, ducks were raised
in 1 of 4 systems: 1) in high-biosecurity closed houses, 2)
in moderately high-biosecurity open houses (ducks raised
for meat and laying ducks); 3) in rice fields after harvest
(free-range or so-called grazing ducks); or 4) in backyards
(backyard ducks). We discuss each method, particularly
emphasizing the role of grazing ducks in the perpetuation
and spread of H5N1 in the country. We also describe the
clinical and pathologic changes in ducks and consider the
current policies regarding duck raising in Thailand. We
conclude that the traditional methods of raising ducks in
Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia must be modified
if we are to control the spread of avian influenza virus. 
Methods of Duck Raising in Thailand
Four systems were in use during 2004 (Figure 1). 
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Pekin ducks and white Cherry Valley ducks are raised
in closed sheds housing 5,000–6,000 birds each. Day-old
ducklings are raised for meat in 50 to 55 days by using an
“all-in/all-out” system. Before the ducks are sent to
slaughter, 60 cloacal samples (≈1%) are collected for virus
isolation. In the slaughterhouse, 60 additional samples are
collected from the same flock for virologic analysis. At the
end of every 50- or 55-day cycle, each poultry house is
cleaned and disinfected. After 3 to 4 weeks, the farm is
repopulated with day-old ducklings and the cycle is repeat-
ed. In 2005, ≈2–3 million ducks were raised in this system.
Open House System 
In the open house system, ducks are raised for meat or
as egg layers. The species raised for meat, Pekin and white
Cherry Valley ducks, are raised essentially as in the closed-
house system with the all-in/all-out strategy. Virologic
sampling is conducted as described above. At present ≈1
million to 2 million ducks are being raised in this system.
The species raised as egg layers are khaki Campbell,
native laying ducks, and a crossbreed of the khaki
Campbell and native laying duck. Layer ducks are housed
in flocks of 3,000 to 4,000 birds. After they begin laying
eggs (at 5 to 6 months of age), these ducks are kept for 12
to 13 months or until they stop laying, at which point they
are sent for slaughter. After a short period for cleaning the
houses, additional ducks are added as space becomes
available. Presently, ≈5 million to 8 million laying ducks
are raised in this system in Thailand. Laying ducks are
sampled for virologic analysis every 3 months. Influenza-
positive flocks are culled.
Grazing System (Free-range Ducks)
In 2004, ducks were also raised in the open on rice
fields. Most free-range ducks are egg-laying ducks such as
khaki Campbell or a crossbreed of khaki Campbell and
native laying ducks. However, a small number of “meat”
ducks, such as Pekin and white Cherry Valley ducks, are
also raised in the open. After hatching and spending 3
weeks in a brooder, young female ducks are moved to rice
paddy fields. For the next 5 to 6 months, they grow by eat-
ing snails and residual rice after the harvest. When the food
supply in 1 field is exhausted, the ducks are moved by
truck to another field, often over considerable distances,
and even from 1 province to another (Figure 2). When the
grazing female ducks are 5–6 months old, they are brought
back to the farms, as in the open system described above.
However, some flocks of female laying ducks are kept in
the rice fields. Male ducks of the species, who are raised
with egg-laying hens, and others that are produced for
meat are raised in the grazing system for 2 months and are
then taken to the slaughterhouses. If they have not reached
the optimal weight for slaughter, they are fed supplemen-
tary rations for 1 to 2 weeks. During the nationwide sur-
veillance campaign in 2004, 60 cloacal swab samples from
each flock were collected for virologic analysis, and the
whole flock was culled if a single duck was positive for
H5N1 by virus isolation. Flocks that were negative for
virus were monitored and put into houses. At the beginning
of 2004, ≈10 million to 11 million grazing ducks were
being raised in Thailand. Raising free-range ducks is cur-
rently illegal in Thailand; all are housed.
Backyard Ducks 
Mixed species of ducks continue to be raised in the
backyards of village homes together with other animals,
including chickens, geese, and pigs. The duck species
raised in backyards include Pekin, white Cherry Valley,
Barbary Muscovy, khaki Campbell, native laying ducks,
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Figure 1. Duck-raising systems in Thailand. 
A) Closed system with high biosecurity, an evapora-
tive cooling system, and strict entrance control. B)
Open system but with netting to prevent entrance of
passerine birds. Biosecurity was not strictly enforced.
This system is no longer approved for the raising of
poultry. C) "Grazing duck raising." Biosecurity is
never practiced in this system. D) Backyard Muscovy
ducks raised for a family; no biosecurity is practiced
in this system and mule ducks (a sterile crossbreed of Muscovy ducks
and native ducks). If a single case of H5N1 infection is
detected in a village, all the poultry in the village are
culled. Approximately 1.0 million to 1.5 million ducks
were raised as backyard ducks at the beginning of the out-
break in 2004; culling reduced that number to <1 million
by August 2005. 
National Surveillance Program 
In response to the H5N1 influenza outbreaks in 2004,
the government of Thailand dispatched teams to villages to
identify infected birds and cull flocks in which infection
was detected.
Sample Collection, Histopathology, 
Virus Isolation, and Serology
During the study period (February to September 2004),
our laboratory received 450 sick, moribund, or dead ducks
from 25 flocks in the western and central provinces of
Thailand. In the detailed studies (Table 1), blood was sam-
pled for serologic analysis by the hemagglutination inhibi-
tion (HI) test. All moribund ducks were euthanized, and
their internal organs were collected, fixed with 10%
buffered formalin, and processed for histopathologic
analysis. Additionally, parts of the brain, lung, trachea,
intestine, liver, pancreas, kidney, ovary, oviduct, testes,
heart, and tight muscle were collected for virus isolation.
The tissues were ground and filtered through 0.2-µ filters.
The filtrates of each organ were injected into 9- to 11-day-
old embryonated chicken eggs and incubated at 37°C for 2
days. The eggs were observed daily to determine whether
death occurred. The allantoic fluid was harvested and test-
ed for influenza virus by HI assay. Any positive sample
was then subtyped for H5N1. A second egg passage was
performed if the embryonated eggs were still alive 72
hours after injection.
H5N1 Subtyping
Avian influenza virus was subtyped by HI assay by
using antiserum specific against the H5 hemagglutinin.
Reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR) analysis was used for H5 and N1 typing (14).
Immunohistochemical Testing
To evaluate histologic changes, we used immunohisto-
chemical testing by indirect immunoperoxidase staining as
described (15). Tissue was fixed in formalin before being
embedded in paraffin, then cut in 5-µ-thick sections and
mounted onto silanized slides. 
Criteria for Culling Ducks
The criteria for culling duck flocks were based on
H5N1 virus isolation and identification by serologic and
RT-PCR analysis (12). During the screening of village
poultry in 2004, a single positive virus isolation resulted in
the culling of all poultry (e.g., chicken, ducks, geese, quail)
in the entire village. If serologic evidence of infection was
detected, cloacal swabs of 60 ducks in that flock were col-
lected and processed for virus isolation in embryonated
chicken eggs. 
Results
Detection of Influenza Viruses in  
Different Duck-raising Systems
Closed High-Biosecurity System
As mentioned earlier, ≈1% of every duck flock was
sampled for H5N1 detection before being sent to slaughter.
More than 10,000 ducks were tested during the study peri-
od. No virologic or serologic evidence of H5N1 virus
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Figure 2. Example of grazing-duck movement. A single flock of
ducks was moved 3 times by truck in 1 season in 2004. The size
of the flock is 3,000–10,000. The time spent at each site depends
on the availability of rice fields at the site: an acre of rice could sup-
port 3,000 ducks for 1 to 2 days. The duck owners have agree-
ments with the landowners regarding the time of harvest and the
acreage available. One flock could spend as long as 1 month at a
single site before being moved to the next.infection was detected in the birds raised in this closed sys-
tem in western Thailand, including Nakornpathom and
Kanchanaburi provinces, despite cocirculation of H5N1
influenza viruses in other duck-raising systems in the
region.
Open House System
Most farms that raised ducks with the open house sys-
tem are in western Thailand, including the 4 provinces of
Nakornpathom, Kanchanaburi, Suphanburi, and Racha-
buri. Birds from 17 farms were tested for infection with
virus; in birds from 4 (23.5%), infection with the H5N1
virus was detected. 
Grazing System
In 28 (45.9%) of the 61 free-range duck flocks tested,
infection with H5N1 influenza virus was detected.
Investigators studied H5N1 infection in 10 flocks of graz-
ing ducks in Ayuthdhaya, Nakornpathom, and Suphanburi
provinces between February and July 2004 to determine the
biologic and pathologic features of H5N1 infection in the
field (Table 1). No virologic or serologic evidence of H5N1
infection was detected in any of the flocks while they were
located in the brooding houses. However, after they were
moved outdoors to the rice fields, infection with H5N1
influenza was detected in all 10 flocks; the earliest infection
was detected 12 days after the ducks left the brooding hous-
es (flock 3, at 42 days of age). The interval between leav-
ing the brooding houses and detection of H5N1 infection
was 12–63 days. Of the 10 flocks, 3 (flocks 2, 8, and 9)
showed disease signs; only a few birds (<1%) in each flock
were clinically affected. However, the interval between ini-
tial detection of H5N1 viruses in the flock and culling was
5–10 days, which supports the contention that most ducks
in the flocks showed no disease signs. 
Serologic evaluation of the flocks showed that low
titers of HI antibody were detected before culling, which
indicates that an immune response had already begun with-
out disease signs in most birds. Cloacal virus titers in indi-
vidual ducks showing disease signs before culling were
2.0–3.8 log10 50% egg infectious dose (EID)50/mL which
shows that virus was being shed in feces (Table 1). Similar
virus titers were detected in asymptomatic ducks.
Signs of disease in flocks, 2, 8, and 9 were depression,
lethargy, cloudy cornea, and blindness. However, no
deaths were observed in the 10 days before culling. 
Backyard Ducks 
Of the backyard poultry, chickens were the most fre-
quently infected; 56% of the chicken flocks tested were
positive for H5N1 influenza (12). Ducks were the second
most frequently infected; 27% of backyard duck flocks
were positive for H5N1. During the second wave of H5N1
infection of poultry and humans in Thailand (August–
November 2004), 47% of backyard duck flocks were
H5N1 positive. During this time, scientists realized that
most ducks infected with H5N1 were asymptomatic. 
Pathologic Features 
As previously mentioned, our laboratory received 450
sick, moribund, or dead ducks, which were studied for
pathologic features of H5N1 infection. These birds had
been raised in the open house system or were from back-
yard flocks. They exhibited signs of disease such as high
fever, dyspnea, depression, and diarrhea, and nervous
signs such as ataxia, incoordination, and convulsions
(Figure 3A). Most had ocular and nasal discharge accom-
panied by conjunctivitis; 20%–100% of the birds in each
flock from which these ducks originated were dead. All
cloacal and tracheal swabs and tissue samples were posi-
tive for H5N1 by HI and RT-PCR (results not shown).
At necropsy, gross lesions were detected, including
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serous fluid surrounding the heart, pancreas, liver, and
abdomen; cyanosis of the oral cavity; and mild pleural effu-
sion. On histopathologic examination, the most striking
lesions were found in the lung, with extensive pneumonia
and severe pulmonary edema with hyaline material in the
alveolar space and slight mononuclear infiltration in the
area surrounding congested vessels (Figure 3B).
Nonsuppurative encephalitis with perivascular cuffing of
mononuclear cells and gliosis were detected in the brains of
ducks that displayed nervous signs. Hyaline degeneration
and necrosis of myocardium with mononuclear infiltration
were detected predominantly in dead ducks from fast-
growing breeds such as the Pekin and white Cherry Valley
ducks. Necrotizing pancreatis with mononuclear infiltration
was detected in all affected ducks. Most affected ducks
exhibited focal hepatitis, tubulonephritis, splenic lymphoid
depletion or necrosis, and enteritis. Virus antigen was
detected by immunohistochemical tests in all organs tested,
including trachea, lung, liver, pancreas, rectum, bursa of
Fabricius, spleen, brain, heart, and kidney (Figure 4).
Experimental Infection of Khaki Campbell Ducks 
Because culling of all H5N1-positive ducks was man-
dated in Thailand, we could not determine the natural out-
come of infection in birds raised in the open on rice fields.
Therefore, khaki Campbell ducks were experimentally
infected with 4 representative H5N1 viruses isolated in
Thailand in 2004 and 2005. All animal experiments were
performed in biosafety level 3+ facilities. All 4 viruses
caused the deaths of infected ducks; however, their degree
of lethality varied (Table 2). The most lethal virus tested
was A/duck/Thailand/71.1/2004, which caused death in
10/10 of the infected khaki Campbell ducks, a death rate
comparable to that previously reported for  Mallard ducks
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Figure 3. A) A White Cherry Valley duck (Anas platyrhynchos),
infected with HPAI H5N1 displays nervous signs, convulsions. B)
Histopathologic features of the lung of an HPAI H5N1–infected
white Cherry Valley duck; infiltration of inflammatory cells in the
lung parenchyma (magnification ×100).
Figure 4. Immunohistochemistry of an HPAI H5N1–infected white
Cherry Valley duck (Anas platyrhynchos). The viral antigen is
detected in myocardial cells and lymphoid cells (arrow) (A) and
renal tubular cells (B) (magnification ×100). The primary antibody
used for immunohistochemistry in this study was a mouse
anti–avian influenza H5 antibody (Magellan Biotechnology,
Chunan, Taiwan).
A
B(16). Also tested was a human virus isolated in 2004,
A/Thailand/MK2/2004, which resulted in the death of 2/10
khaki Campbell ducks. Of the two 2005 viruses tested, 1
caused very slight disease and resulted in only 1/10 deaths
(A/quail/Thailand/551/2005) whereas the other
(A/duck/Thailand/144/2005) resulted in 5/10 deaths.
Ducks inoculated with A/Thailand/MK2/04 shed virus for
the longest period of time (day 10 postinfection), whereas
the 2005 virus isolates were shed only until day 8 postin-
fection. These results indicate that the H5N1 avian viruses
recently isolated in Thailand can cause death in khaki
Campbell ducks; however, several infected ducks
remained completely healthy with no signs of disease
throughout the study.    
Current Status of Duck Raising in Thailand
As of October 2005, the government of Thailand for-
bids the practice of raising ducks in open fields and mov-
ing grazing ducks from 1 region to another. Farmers who
do so are subject to fines and other punishments.
Additionally, they receive no compensation if they raise
ducks in the open free-range system, and the ducks
become infected with H5N1. Farmers were initially com-
pensated for the culling of their ducks. Duck raising is now
confined to the high-biosecurity system. 
After a lull of almost 1 year, a case of human H5N1
infection was reported in Thailand in October 2005. The
report was preceded by the illegal grazing of 3 flocks of
3,000 to 5,000 free-range ducks in rice fields in the area
(Kanchanaburi Province). Although no direct contact
between the grazing ducks and backyard chickens was
known, within 2 weeks of the arrival of the ducks, chick-
ens in the area began dying, and a person who had direct
contact with the diseased chickens died of H5N1 infection.
Approximately 500 backyard chickens were culled in the
village. Sequence analysis of the human isolate and avian
isolates (duck and chicken) from this area would be essen-
tial to confirm the epidemiologic link between these cases
and, coupled with the chronology of events, to assess
whether free-grazing ducks were indeed the source of
infection for this outbreak.
Discussion
The 4 duck-raising systems in wide use at the beginning
of the 2004 Thai epidemic differed markedly in cases of
influenza detected. No infections with H5N1 influenza
virus were detected in ducks raised in the closed system,
attesting to the effectiveness of the biosecurity employed.
In contrast, H5N1 infection was detected in ducks raised in
all 3 open systems. Notably, infection in the hatchery or
during the 3 weeks of brooding was detected only after the
ducks were released into the rice fields. The source of the
H5N1 viruses infecting domestic ducks in the rice fields
remains controversial. Because H5N1 viruses were detect-
ed in herons, storks, egrets, and other dead waterfowl in
Eastern Asia, the initial spread of the highly pathogenic
viruses in this region of the world has been attributed to
wild migrating birds. What role wild migrating birds had
in the spread of H5N1 influenza virus is now a moot ques-
tion. The widespread outbreaks and massive die-off of bar-
headed geese and other species in western China (17,18),
and the spread of H5N1 to central Asia (Kazakhstan,
southern Russia, and Turkey) and more recently to
Romania and Croatia in eastern Europe, are likely caused
by wild migratory birds.
Detailed studies of 10 flocks of grazing ducks in
Thailand in the present study showed infection with H5N1
influenza virus in all flocks. Although the ducks shed virus
for 5 to 10 days, few ducks showed disease signs, and in
some flocks, no ducks were symptomatic. Prolonged shed-
ding of H5N1 viruses in experimentally infected ducks has
been previously described (16,19), but prolonged shedding
in free-range ducks has not. Therefore, free-range (graz-
ing) ducks that are moved long distances by truck and that
do not necessarily show disease signs are an optimal vehi-
cle for the spread of H5N1 viruses throughout the country.
These findings support the need for regulations that forbid
the practice of raising ducks on the free range, a need
underscored by the association of the recent human infec-
tion with illegal free-range duck grazing.
This study also points out the dangers of raising ducks
in the open systems without complete biosecurity.
Although stopping the commercial raising of ducks in
open system may be impossible, the more problematic
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al village livestock. Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza
virus is now likely endemic in poultry in Vietnam,
Cambodia, China, and Indonesia. The vaccine option
should be considered if backyard duck raising is to contin-
ue in Southeast Asia.
Although no human cases of H5N1 have been attrib-
uted to direct contact with ducks in Thailand, free-grazing
ducks have been identified as a risk factor for the occur-
rence of H5N1 outbreaks among chickens (13). In
Vietnam, however, reported human cases of H5N1 influen-
za have potentially been linked to the consumption of raw
duck blood dishes (http://www.who.int/csr/don/2005_01_
21/ en/index.html). Therefore, H5N1-infected ducks are a
risk factor for both commercial and backyard poultry and
potentially for humans as well. Since the introduction of
the nationwide comprehensive surveillance program (“x-
ray surveys”) in Thailand (12) and the culling of all infect-
ed poultry, human cases of H5N1 infection have been
markedly reduced. Traditional methods of duck raising in
Thailand and in the rest of Southeast Asia must be modi-
fied if we are to control highly pathogenic H5N1 avian
influenza.
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